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2004 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 5-7, 2004 
 
Mark your calendar! The 
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State University, and was awarded his teaching 
credential from California State University. His 
education as a Risk Manager and experience as a 
practicing Attorney, coupled with his extensive 
background in law enforcement, have allowed him 
to rapidly become recognized internationally as a olume 3 Issue 5 
eptember/October 2003 
 
British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
ritish Columbia Police Academy are hosting the 
004 Police Leadership Conference in beautiful 
ancouver, British Columbia.  This is Canada’s 
argest police leadership conference and the 
heme for this year is Excellence in Policing 
hrough Community health, Organizational 
erformance, and Personal wellness. The 
onference will provide an opportunity for 
elegates to hear leadership topics discussed by 
ively and renowned keynote speakers.  
he Conference will be held April 5-7, 2004 at 
he beautiful and picturesque waterfront Westin 
ayshore Resort & Marina. Register early as the 
revious conference was sold out. Early 
egistration is $325 before March 1, 2004. 
eynote speakers: 
r. Gordon Graham 
Gordon Graham is a 30 
year veteran of California 
Law Enforcement. He 
holds a Master's Degree 
in Safety and Systems 
Management from the 
University of Southern 
California, a Juris 
Doctorate from Western 
dynamic presenter with multiple areas of 
expertise. 
 
Over the last decade, Mr. Graham has spoken to 
over 300,000 law enforcement and other public 
safety professionals from every state in the US. 
Since 1990, he consistently received the highest 
evaluations on California P.O.S.T critiques. In 
1995, Mr. Graham received the Governor's Award 
for Excellence in Law Enforcement Training, the 
highest tribute available in the critical mission of 
training police professionals. His penetrating wit 
coupled with his vast knowledge in multiple 
disciplines provides the enlightened listener, 
regardless of rank, with an information packed 
seminar that will benefit them in current and 
future assignments. 
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan  
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
joined the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary in 1970 
and was promoted 
through the ranks, 
attaining the post of 
Chief Constable in 
1996. In 1998 he 
received a Knighthood 
in the New Year Honours List. In 2002, Sir Ronnie 
retired from the police service and was appointed 
Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for 
London and the East Region and also the Ministry 
of Defence Police, UK Atomic Energy Authority 
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Police, Guernsey, Jersey, the Sovereign Base in 
Cyprus and the Isle of Man. His portfolio 
responsibilities include Public Order, Terrorism, 
Ports and Special Branch, and Officer Safety. 
 
Sir Ronnie has travelled extensively in Europe and 
the United States to study policing methods. He 
has attended all the major courses, including the 
Senior Command Course at the Police Staff 
College at Bramshill. Holding a Bachelor of Arts 
degree and a Master of Arts degree in 
Administration and Legal Studies, he is also a 
graduate of the FBI Academy. In 2002 Sir Ronnie 
was awarded a Knight Grand Cross of the Order 
of the British Empire in the Queen's Birthday 
Honours List.   
 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin 
 
A veteran of the U.S. 
Marine Corps, Dr. 
Gilmartin is a principal 
in Gilmartin, Harris and 
Associates a Behavioral 
Sciences/ Management 
Consulting Company 
specializing in law 
enforcement/ public 
safety consultation. He holds a doctoral degree in 
clinical psychology from the University of Arizona 
and is the author of the book Emotional Survival 
for Law Enforcement: A Guide for Officers and 
Their Families. He holds adjunct faculty 
instructor positions with the University of 
Massachusetts Police Leadership Institute, and 
the Sam Houston State University Law 
Enforcement Management Institute of Texas. He 
is an instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, 
Virginia and a faculty member of the FBI Law 
Enforcement Executive Development Institute 
(LEEDS and EDI). He is also a guest instructor at 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in 
Glynco, Georgia. He is retained by several Federal 
law enforcement agency critical incident response 
teams.  
 
Dr. Gilmartin formerly spent twenty years in law 
enforcement in Arizona. During his tenure, he 
supervised the agency Behavioral Sciences Unit 
and the Hostage Negotiations Team. He is a 
former recipient of an IACP-Parade Magazine 
National Police Officer Citation Award for 
contributions during hostage negotiations.  
 
RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli 
 
Commissioner Giuliano 
Zaccardelli joined the 2
RCMP in 1970, and 
following recruit 
training was posted to 
Alberta where he 
performed a number of 
general policing duties. 
He was commissioned in 
1986 and was promoted to the rank of Deputy 
Commissioner, responsible for National 
Headquarters. In August 1999, Commissioner 
Zaccardelli assumed the newly created position of 
Deputy Commissioner, Organized Crime and 
Operational Policy.  
 
In 2000 Commissioner Zaccardelli officially 
became the 20th Commissioner of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. He holds a Bachelor of 
Commerce degree in Business Administration 
from Loyola College in Montreal and has 
completed the National Executive Institute 
Program at the FBI Academy in 1998. He is also a 
graduate of the Senior Command Course at 
Bramshill Police Staff College in England. 
 
For more updates on this conference as they 
develop, please bookmark: 
 
www.policeleadership.org 
 
For information, support, or sponsorship 
opportunities, contact the Police Leadership 
Conference Coordinator Sgt. Mike Novakowski at 
604-528-5733, toll free 1-877-275-4333 local 
5733, or e-mail at mnovakowski.jibc.bc.ca. 
 MOTOR VEHICLE ACT DRIVING 
PROHIBITION NOT 
PUNISHMENT 
R. v. Sull, 2003 BCCA 321 
 
The accused was convicted in 
coming from his truck. Although the accused 
denied there was marihuana in the truck, he 
admitted to recently smoking a joint. Following 
confirmation of his driving status, the accused 
was arrested for driving while prohibited. When 
told the vehicle would be towed, he asked the 
officer to retrieve some of his belongings from British Columbia Provincial Court 
of refusing to provide a breath 
sample and impaired driving. He 
was sentenced to nine months imprisonment and 
prohibited under s.259 of the Criminal Code for 
three years. In addition, the judge prohibited him 
from driving under British Columbia’s Motor 
Vehicle Act for a period of 10 years. The accused 
appealed under Part XXI of the Criminal Code to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that 
the ten year prohibition under the Motor Vehicle 
Act was excessive.  
 
The provincial driving prohibition could either be 
imposed as punishment or as a civil disability 
arising from the criminal convictions. If the 
prohibition was imposed as punishment then an 
appeal court could quash it. However, in this case 
the judge made the prohibition to protect the 
public; this was his 10th drinking driving 
conviction. Therefore, the prohibition was neither 
punishment nor a sentence. If there was a remedy 
to be sought, it would have to come from the 
provincial Motor Vehicle Act or Offence Act, not 
the Criminal Code. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SEARCH UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
R. v. Wong, 2003 BCCA 188 
 
The accused was stopped for 
speeding and admitted to the 
the cab of the truck. While in the cab, the 
officer could smell an odour of dried, not smoked, 
marihuana. After viewing a large garbage bag 
through a side window in the canopy, the officer 
searched the bag and found several zip-lock bags 
of marihuana. The accused was subsequently 
arrested for possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, the 
search was found to be unlawful and a violation of 
s.8 of the Charter. However, the evidence was 
admitted under s.24(2) and the accused was 
convicted. The accused appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that the trial 
was unfair because the judge erred in admitting 
the marihuana and also that there was no 
evidence to prove possession. 
 
Admission of the Evidence 
 
In determining whether the evidence should be 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter, a court 
must consider the following three matters: 
• trial fairness; 
• the seriousness of the Charter violation; and 
• whether the admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration to justice into 
disrepute. 
 
In addressing each of these issues, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
Here, the trial was not unfair. The marihuana was 
real, non-conscriptive evidence and only in rare 
and exceptional cases will its admission render a 
trial unfair. Nor was the Charter violation serious. Volume 3 Issue 5 
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officer that he did not have a 
driver’s licence because he was 
prohibited from driving.  At this 
time the officer detected an odour of marihuana 
The search was not obtrusive, the accused’s 
expectation of privacy was reduced, and the 
officer acted in good faith and on a reasonably 
based suspicion. The offence was serious and 
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without the evidence there would be no case. The 
exclusion of the evidence, not its inclusion, would 
tend to bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.  
 
Possession 
 
The accused submitted that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove the elements of 
possession; knowledge, control, and consent. He 
argued that it was beyond common sense to send 
the officer back to the truck to get his 
belongings if he knew there were drugs in it. 
Although it was open to the judge to draw this 
inference, she did not. The appeal court was not 
persuaded the trial judge’s findings were 
unreasonable. The truck belonged to the accused, 
the sole occupant and driver. Since the smell of 
marihuana was noticeable to the officer, it must 
have been apparent to the accused.  The 
conviction was upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
911 TAPES ADMISSIBLE TO 
DEMONSTRATE CALLER’S 
STATE OF MIND  
R. v. Stapleton, 2003 BCCA 444 
 
The accused appealed his 
convictions at a jury trial on 
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demonstrating their mental condition and state of 
mind at the time the events were unfolding. In 
charging the jury members, the judge properly 
told them to limit the use of the 911 tapes only to 
rebutting the suggestion of recent fabrication 
and to understand the complainants’ state of 
mind.  There was no error in the admission of the 
evidence or in the instructions to the jury. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SEARCH PROPERLY CONDUCTED 
INCIDENTAL TO ARREST WITH 
WARRANT: DRUGS ADMITTED 
R. v. Pham, 2003 BCCA 460 
 
Police officers saw the accused 
and a female companion descend 
the stairs from a suite known 
for the use and sale of drugs. 
Upon seeing the officers, the 
accused and his companion changed their 
direction of travel. The officers overtook them 
and asked them for their names and dates of 
birth. They complied. While one officer 
conducted a radio check for warrants, the second 
officer asked them to empty their pockets onto 
the ground. The accused placed his contents, 
including gum wrappers and a crack pipe, on the 
ground. At this time it was learned there was an olume 3 Issue 5 
eptember/October 2003 
charges of robbery and 
possession of a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace by 
rguing that the trial judge erred in admitting 
he complainants’ 911 call to police as evidence to 
ebut the defence’s suggestion of recent 
abrication. He also argued that the judge erred 
n instructing the jury that the call could be used 
s evidence to reflect the state of mind of the 
allers. The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
oncluded the trial judge did not err and 
ismissed the appeal.  
he call was real evidence. The contents of the 
onversation, the phraseology used, and the 
allers’ tone of voice were all relevant in 4
outstanding Immigration related warrant for the 
accused and he was arrested, handcuffed, and 
searched. Police found a small package of heroine 
and 31 cocaine rocks on the accused. A further 
eight more crack rocks were found in the gum 
wrappers he had placed on the ground earlier. 
 
Although the British Columbia Provincial Court 
trial judge found that the police were justified in 
stopping the accused “because of the nature of 
the place he had just left”, he concluded the 
initial search was unreasonable and a breach of 
s.8 of the Charter. However, after his arrest on 
the outstanding warrant, the police were entitled 
to search him incidental to the arrest. The s.8 
violation was brief and the drugs were 
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nonetheless admitted under s.24(2). The accused 
was convicted of possession of cocaine and 
possession of heroin. The accused appealed to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal suggesting that 
the evidence should have been excluded.  
 
Justice Low, writing for the unanimous appeal 
court, concluded that all the drugs were 
discovered during a lawful search: 
 
Here the police officers learned of the warrant 
outstanding for the arrest of the [accused].  At 
that stage, they not only had legal justification 
to arrest the [accused], they had a duty to 
arrest him.  The second part of the search was 
incidental to the arrest and reasonable.  In my 
opinion, it is not necessary to decide whether 
the [accused] was detained by the officers 
before they learned of the arrest warrant 
because they discovered the bulk of the drugs 
during a lawful and reasonable search incidental 
to the arrest.  They did not learn of the 
presence of drugs before that because neither 
of them had inspected the items the [accused] 
placed on the ground.  Therefore, the presence 
of drugs was not revealed until after the search 
became lawful and reasonable.  In addition, the 
cocaine on the ground would have been 
discovered in any event during the search 
incidental to the arrest. [para.6]  
 
Since there was no s.8 Charter breach, s.24(2) 
was not engaged. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ARRANGING SEX WITH 
FICTITIOUS YOUTH RESULTS 
IN ATTEMPT CONVICTION 
R. v. Kerster, 2003 BCCA 246 
 
The accused, expressing a desire 
to obtain the sexual services of 
a person under 18, exchanged e-
mails with a police officer. The 
officer, posing as the husband of 
a woman with three children, suggested a meet 
with the accused to make arrangements for him 
to have sex with her fictitious 11 year old 
daughter. The accused met with a person posing 
as the mother, accompanied her to a hotel room 
where the child would allegedly be found, and was 
arrested. The accused unsuccessfully argued at 
trial that culpability would only attach if a real 
person, not a fictitious one, from whom sexual 
services may be obtained existed. The trial judge 
found the accused had taken steps beyond mere 
preparation to carry out his intent and was 
therefore convicted of attempting to obtain for 
consideration sexual services from a person he 
believed was under 18 years old contrary to 
s.212(4) of the Criminal Code. The accused 
appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
submitting that if a real person does not exist, he 
could not be convicted of an attempt. The appeal 
court disagreed and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
 
LIVING ROOM IS A PUBLIC 
PLACE UNDER PROPER 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
R. v. Clark, 2003 BCCA 408 
 
A neighbour, in a nearby house, 
observed the accused standing in 
a brightly lit room of his home 
masturbating while naked. The 
curtains were open and at one 
point the accused stood on a stool making himself 
more visible. The accused was looking into the 
neighbour’s home and watching the occupants, 
including two young girls. The police were called 
and when they arrived they saw the accused 
standing at the window masturbating. As the 
police approached the home, he retreated from 
the window and the lights were extinguished. 
After repeatedly knocking at the door, the police 5
were allowed to enter and the accused was 
arrested. 
 
At trial the accused was convicted in British 
Columbia Provincial Court of committing an 
indecent act in a public place contrary to 
s.173(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Based on the 
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circumstances, the judge concluded that the 
accused’s living room became a public place. This 
was affirmed on appeal to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court. The accused further appealed to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that 
his living room was not a public place. 
 
In upholding the conviction, Justice Hall for the 
unanimous appeal court dismissed the appeal. 
There was an “inescapable inference” from the 
circumstances that the accused was acting in an 
exhibitionist manner and seeking to draw 
attention to himself. Justice Hall stated: 
 
In my view, the proven circumstances of this 
case lead inexorably to the conclusion that 
this appellant intentionally conducted himself 
in an indecent way, seeking to draw the 
attention of others (members of the public) to 
himself on the evening in question.  I consider 
the conviction registered against him to be 
soundly based in fact and law…[para. 10] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE 
JUSTIFIES DETENTION 
R. v. Willis, 2003 MBCA 54 
 
Two patrol officers saw a person 
running through a clearing in a 
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the front of his body over an obvious bulge in his 
jacket.  
 
The accused told the officer that his house had 
been broken into and that he was after the thief. 
The accused was arrested for break and enter 
and theft and possession of crime property and 
he was pat searched. Items linking him to a 
recent robbery were found. The police 
subsequently located the white sheet and 
property belonging to the robbery victim between 
some houses and blood found on the accused’s 
jacket belonged to the victim.  
 
The accused was charged with robbery and break 
and enter but he argued that the police breached 
his rights under s. 8 (search and seizure) and s.9 
(arbitrary detention) of the Charter. The trial 
judge convicted the accused after finding the 
police had reasonable grounds to effect an 
arrest. The accused appealed to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred 
in concluding that his rights were not infringed.  
 
In dismissing the appeal, Manitoba’s top court 
noted that an accused bears the burden of 
proving that they were arbitrarily detained. In 
this case, the police did not know a crime had 
been committed, they only saw something 
suspicious, which did not amount to reasonable olume 3 Issue 5 
eptember/October 2003 
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residential area with a white 
sheet draped over his head 
containing items bundled inside. 
 description was broadcast on the police radio 
nd an officer gave chase on foot. After losing 
ight of the person when he ran between some 
ouses, the officer slowed to a walk. The officer 
hen saw the accused, recognized him from past 
ealings, and knew he lived 5 km away. The 
ccused turned and walk towards the officer, but 
id not have a white sheet and somewhat 
iffered from the original description. As the 
ccused engaged the officer in a conversation, he 
ould back up whenever the officer moved 
orward. The officer noted The accused’ 
reathing was laboured, he was fidgety, would not 
ake eye contact, and was holding his hands in 
grounds. The break and enter was not reported 
until nine minutes after the arrest and “there was 
nothing objectively probable to link the accused 
with the commission of an offence.” Thus, the 
trial judge erred in finding that the police had 
the requisite criteria necessary to justify the 
arrest. However, an unlawful arrest does not 
necessarily equate to an arbitrary detention. If 
the officer had an articulable cause, regardless 
of his intention to arrest, the effect of his 
conduct may nonetheless pass Charter scrutiny.  
 
Under the investigative detention doctrine, the 
police are justified in detaining persons if they 
have an articulable cause (aka: reasonable 
suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect) the 
person was involved in a crime. Articulable cause 
is a legal standard, above suspicion but below 
 Volume 3 Issue 5 
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reasonable grounds for belief. Here, the Court 
concluded that there was a constellation of facts 
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion, despite the 
disparity in description and police losing sight of 
the suspect during the foot chase. The Court 
rejected the accused’s submission that the police 
can only detain persons for investigations when 
they have an actual known crime. Based on the 
circumstances in this case, detaining the accused 
to question him for a few minutes was lawful. The 
detention was not arbitrary and therefore there 
was no s.9 violation. 
 
As for the search, the appeal court cautioned 
that not all searches incidental to detention will 
be justified. Justice Steel, writing for the 
unanimous court, stated: 
 
[A] minimal search incidental to a lawful 
detention can be reasonable provided that the 
purpose of the search is to ensure the safety 
of the police and “any passing public”. The 
scope of such a “minimal search” would 
normally consist of a “pat-down” or “frisk.” 
There may be situations where this would be 
too intrusive and situations where more is 
reasonable. 
 
And further: 
 
There are two competing values at work in 
these scenarios that occur routinely on our 
streets. Police officers are at risk everyday. 
They never know when a routine, mundane 
situation will explode into violence. 
Therefore…it is undesirable to measure with 
extreme nicety whether their safety or that of 
the public in any particular search requires 
more or less than a quick pat-down. On the 
other hand, an individual has a right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure. There is 
a temptation for authorities to sometimes use 
such a search as an opportunity to obtain 
evidence of a crime. That temptation must be 
resisted strongly by the courts. 
 
Here, the officer was concerned that the 
accused might be concealing a weapon in his 
jacket. Moreover, the officer had prior 
knowledge of the accused that also gave him 
reason to believe he could be violent. This 
subjective concern for safety was also supported 
objectively. The circumstances leading to the 
detention, the bulge in the jacket, the way it was 
being held, and the knowledge of past violence 
objectively substantiated the officer’s concern. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH 
JUSTIFIED FOLLOWING 
DETENTION 
R. v. Hunt, 2003 BCCA 434 
 
The police arrested the accused, 7
who matched the general 
description of a bank robbery 
suspect, 1.5 km away from and 15 
to 20 minutes after the robbery. 
He was walking and looking over his shoulder and 
from side to side. The police searched the 
accused because they believed the robbery 
suspect had a weapon. As a result of the search 
police found 30 x $100 bills, the amount taken 
from the robbery. A jury convicted the accused 
of robbery, but he appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that the police 
lacked the articulable cause necessary to justify 
an investigative detention, the resultant search 
was unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter, and 
the evidence should have been excluded. In 
dismissing his appeal, Justice Oppal, for a 
unanimous court, concluded that the police 
reasonably suspected the accused was involved in 
the robbery and had an articulable cause to 
search him for an investigative purpose. The trial 
judge did not err in holding the search reasonable 
and the conviction stood.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Don't tell people how to do things, tell them 
what to do and let them surprise you with their 
results” -  George S. Patton 
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PATROLS ON THE WILD SIDE:  
WHERE FACTS ARE OFTEN 
FUNNIER THAN FICTION   
collected By Constable Ian Barraclough 
 
Being proud of your family grow op   
 
The family-run marijuana growing 
operation Bellevue police say they 
walked into sounds like something 
out of a drug-induced 
hallucination itself. Residents 
called police at 3am to deal with a 
group of teens running around 
the neighborhood and Officers 
Travis Nunn and Jesse Brewer 
spotted several teenagers running into a nearby 
home. 
 
Bellevue Police Chief Bill Cole said officers were 
invited inside where three residents and two 
teenage visitors provided a tour of the home. Cole 
said the indoor marijuana growing operation 
literally greeted visitors at the front door. "One 
of the kids came to the door -- and standing in 
the corner of the living room was a marijuana 
plant that was 4 or 5 feet high, displayed in like a 
house plant stand," Cole said.  
 
"One of the kids in the house then said, 'Yep, 
we've got more' and took the officers through 
the rest of the house and showed them the rest 
of the plants and everything. ...This was 
unbelievable. ...I couldn't believe they would leave 
it all out in the open like that." Cole said a 
bedroom was wallpapered with aluminum foil to 
reflect indoor growing lights onto plants, including 
those establishing roots in a crude hydroponics 
system.  
 
Cole said harvested plants were suspended in a 
closet equipped with drying fans to shorten time 
from sprout to street sale. "There were 19 plants 
seized, Cole said. “If you just looked around the 
living room there were bongs and pipes and joints 
all over the living room. ...We seized grow lights, 
foil, books, fertilizer, water jugs, sets of scales 
and packaging materials."  
 
Cole said police believe it was a family-run 
operation, including the teenagers' 42-year-old 
mother, Bernadette Dusing, who was home at the 
time. Dusing, her 19-year-old daughter, Danielle 
Dusing and a 15-year-old child were all arrested 
and charged with cultivating marijuana, possession 
of drug paraphernalia and trafficking in 
marijuana.  
 
"She was aware of the whole thing. ...It is 
extremely sad ...it really is," Cole said. "Especially 
(when) we've been stepping up our efforts with 
drugs and kids, and in most cases we consider 
parents to be our partners. In this case, the 
parent was obviously not our partner." 
Shelly Whitehead Kentucky Post, 03-06-24. 
 
Don’t play with handcuffs 
 
Ten-year-old Brian Kline 8
wanted to be close to his dad 
on Father's Day, so he took an 
old pair of handcuffs and 
cuffed himself to his father, 
wrist to wrist. It was a cute 
little joke, until they couldn't find the key. So 
they called the Des Moines Police Department and 
Brian's dad, William Kline Jr., 33, had a good 
laugh about it with police dispatchers. Brian and 
his dad continued to joke about it while they 
waited for the police to arrive. William and Brian 
Kline then thanked officers for releasing them 
and everyone was happy. 
 
However, when officers ran Kline on their 
computer system, they immediately returned and 
told William they had warrants for his arrest. 
Kline was back in handcuffs - this time police 
cuffs - and on his way to jail. "I was hoping to 
spend more time with my kids on Father's Day," 
Kline said Monday afternoon. "I ended up 
spending the last part of it with 13 other guys in 
the City Jail." "It was kind of ironic," Kline 
agreed. "But also a little embarrassing." He was 
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transferred to the Polk County Jail and released 
Monday after posting bond. 
 
"Everyone was professional about it; the cops 
were just doing their job," said Kline. He had 
handcuffs at the house because he worked for a 
security company about a decade ago. "The key is 
upstairs somewhere," he said. "I just don't know 
where." 
Tom Alex Des Moines Register, 03-06-17  
 
Beware of bow and arrows during 
traffic stops  
 
As Orange County 
sheriff's deputy Owen 
Hall was standing beside 
a car he had stopped, he 
was shot in the leg with 
an arrow. After Hall 
pulled the arrow out and reported to a hospital, 
deputies combed the neighbourhood to locate the 
perpetrator. The deputy had made a traffic stop 
and was giving the female motorist a warning, but 
investigators do not believe there was any link 
between the stop and the arrow shooting. A 
patrol car camera captured an image of the 
hunting arrow as it came from a southeast 
direction and struck the deputy's right calf.  
 
The tape shows the deputy removing the arrow, 
which chipped a bone in his leg. The deputy let 
the woman motorist go, because he was unsure if 
someone was shooting at him. Deputies canvassed 
the area until darkness fell, then they began a 
door-to-door search the next day. When they 
knocked at 44yr old Tri Thanh Lam's residence, 
he opened his garage door and deputies saw a bow 
and arrows that matched the one that struck the 
deputy. 
 
Lam was arrested, but he went free two days 
later when authorities realized that he had 
committed no crime, since the state's negligent-
shooting law applies only to guns.  
Los Angeles Times, 03-07-02 
 
FINDING FUN IN 
FITNESS 
Cst. Kelly Keith 
 
 
Ways to beef up your work-out: 
 
• Increase time under tension (longer time to 
do one rep); 
• Use music to inspire you, Stay Motivated!; 
• Increase the tempo of your work-out (reduce 
rest between sets); 
• Increase the weight lifted; 
• Have a goal, plan, and method to your madness 
• Increase your sets or reps; 
• Increase range of motion; 
• Decrease range of motion and work on your 
weak area’s; 
• Ensure you have a high glycemic drink 
(Gatorade etc. within 15 minutes) to enhance 
recovery; 
• Use spotters – Get a motivating training 
partner; 
• Use visualization techniques in the gym; 
• Remember exercising and eating go hand in 
hand – Be Smart!; 
• Keep a log book of your progress; 
• Try different training techniques; and 
• Learn, Learn and Learn more about what you 
are doing 
 
In the flow: 
 
“Flow” is the state of being completely absorbed 
in the performance and action of your sport.  The 
next time you are in the flow, take the time to 
think about how your body feels, your posture, 
what you ate, how your breathing, and what all is 
going right in your life.   Top athletes have 
duplicated the flow by thinking the same thoughts 
and copying their postures and mindset. Don’t 
waste the opportunity – next time get in the flow! 
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How does age affect physical fitness and 
exercise programs? 
 
Your maximum fitness can be achieved while you 
are in your late 20's.  However, you must keep in 
mind that the figures below assume everything is 
equal.  If you are in your 40's and you've decided 
to change your eating habits, use better 
technique in the gym and live a fitter lifestyle. 
You can be in better shape while you are in your 
40's than when you were in your 20's. 
  
These are the stats: 
25-27 = 100 %: Optimal 
30 = 95 %  
40 = 85 %  
50 = 70 % 
60 = 60 % 
70 = 48 %  
80 = 38 % 
  
As for exercise programs - the older you are, the 
better form you should use due to an increased 
risk of injury.  As well you should use higher reps 
because muscle endurance is more important. 
  
Is there a standard chart/form to 
determine how far or fast a person has to 
run to get in shape? 
  
There is no chart or form to determine this.  
There is no clear definition of what is "in shape".  
Everyone has different starting points.  What is 
important is that you start and stay 
consistent.  To progress in your fitness, push your 
limits, whatever they may be. Exercise regularly. 
The following are exercise guidelines:  
  
• try exercising for 20 minutes, 4 times per 
week; 
• at first start with gentle exercises and 
increase the intensity as you get fitter;  
• don't overdo it; and 
• try to walk or cycle short distances, instead 
of taking the bus or going by car. 
  
 
Is a person who can run 1.5 miles in 10 
minutes in better shape and more healthy 
than a person who runs the same 1.5 miles 
in 15 minutes ? 
  
All things being equal = if your effort, pre race 
nutrition, sleep, and ability are the same then the 
answer is YES. All aerobic endurance activities 
are essentially contests to see how much oxygen 
your body can deliver to your exercising muscles.  
Increase the amount of oxygen and you can go 
faster. All aerobic training improves your aerobic 
capacity, even slow, relaxed jogging.  But some 
workouts improve it more than others. The 
best and most efficient way to increase your 
aerobic capacity is to run slightly faster (10 to 30 
seconds per mile) than your 5 km pace.  Or if your 
cycling, cycle faster for wind sprints, or if your 
swimming, swim faster every 3rd lap. 
   
If a person is a slow runner, does that 
mean that they have poor cardio ? 
  
The short answer is no. Skeletal muscles make up 
over half of a lean individual’s body weight.  The 
muscle cells contain two distinct types of muscle 
cells or fibers. 
  
• Type I - Slow Twitch - These are the major 
muscle fibers in use at 70 - 80 % VO2 MAX. 
 
• Type II - Fast Twitch - These are called into 
action for sprints when the athlete 
approaches 100 % of their maximum 
performance. 
  
The relative proportion of Type I and Type II 
fibers within a muscle varies from person to 
person and is determined by genetics (i.e. 
inherited from your parents).  The ratio can be 
modified with exercise and training.  Succinctly, 
an endurance runner has slower twitch muscle 
fibers while the sprinters have faster twitch 
muscle fibers. There are persons that have a 
genetic advantage when it comes to sprinting or 
distance activities.  A person can be a slow 
runner in a sprint and in awesome shape as they 
can run slowly for a long distance.   
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This may seem to contradict the previous answer, 
however when we are talking about 1.5 miles, we 
are talking about aerobic endurance only.  Usually 
when we are talking about IN SHAPE, we are 
talking about aerobic endurance.   
 
No time to exercise? 
 
One of the most common reasons people have for 
not exercising is that they do not have the time.  
There are a number of barriers to exercising 
such as studying (exercise is proven to enhance 
the clarity of your mind!), family commitments, 
cost, lack of facilities, etc. 
 
95 % of people can achieve their goals in 3 
hours per week. This is approximately 3% of 
your waking hours every week. Ask yourself – Do 
you really need more time or more discipline?  If 
you truly believe that you do not have enough 
time, try to keep a log of your time throughout 
the day for a one week period and see where your 
hours in the day are spent (including sleeping 
hours).  Check into how much of your time is spent 
on the computer, in front of the TV, oversleeping, 
reading, etc.  Possibly there are some gaps that 
you can sneak in 3 hours per week to exercise. 
 
Why exercise?   Briefly, exercise enhances 
sleep, improves digestion, increases metabolism, 
builds strength and endurance, lowers resting 
heart rate, strengthens the heart, lowers high 
blood pressure, improves mood, cops need to be in 
shape, etc…… Make exercise part of your 
everyday routine, be consistent, vary your 
exercises, and make it fun! 
 
You need variety in your exercises: 
 
If you have a workout routine and have not 
changed it your body will adapt and gains will 
cease.  Unchanging routines lead to overuse 
injuries, every time you repeat a program it 
becomes less effective, and too much time on any 
one routine and your body will adapt to the 
positive aspects and accumulate the negative 
ones.  KEEP CHANGING THINGS! 
 
THE MYTH OF THE NAKED MAN 
Sgt. Dave Schmirler 
 
Recently, a fresh class of 
recruits were involved in a low 
level foot pursuit drill in an 
Arrest and Control class.  The 
recruits were just starting out 
week two at the Police Academy.  During a 
discussion about the assumption of weapons on 
suspects, a recruit indicated that the only surely 
unarmed suspect was the “naked” suspect.  The 
Arrest and Control Sergeant immediately 
challenged this assumption and provided some 
good examples of when this was not the case. In 
one recent example, officers in a nearby 
jurisdiction were involved in a strip search of a 
person taken into custody.  A small caliber 
handgun and other evidence were located in 
between the buttocks of the suspect. 
 
This also reminds us of the death in 2002 of 
Deputy Herzog of the King County Sheriff’s 
Department in Washington State.  Deputy 
Herzog, a former US Army veteran and 7 year 
member, responded to a call of a disturbance 
involving a naked man one Saturday afternoon in 
June.  During an attempt to subdue the man, 
Deputy Herzog used pepper spray without 
success.  Herzog was attacked by the man and 
had his .40 caliber Glock  knocked to the ground 
with the magazine becoming detached.  The 
suspect picked up the Glock and re-inserted the 
magazine.  As Deputy Herzog retreated he was 
shot and knocked to the ground.  The suspect 
then stood over the Deputy and shot him 10 more 
times. 
 
We import a variety of weapons into every 
situation we engage in.  Instructors and 
experienced officers must challenge assumptions 
in recruits that can lead to tragedy.  The 
assumption of “safety” in dealing with naked 
suspects is one of them.   
 
Rest in Peace Deputy Herzog. 
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POLICE ACADEMY BLOCK ONE: 
THRILLS AND SPILLS- 
A RETROSPECTIVE 
Cst. Bouchey Vancouver Police 
Cst. Asplin Abbotsford Police 
 
Whether it was a long time ago or as recent as 
yesterday, every municipal police officer in 
British Columbia remembers their first 
experiences in Block One of the Police Academy. 
These experiences started at the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia as part of a three 
block process. The following contains some 
personal experiences and memories of Block One 
that will give new recruits some insight into what 
they are getting themselves into and provide 
some useful tips on how to make Block One as 
painless as possible. It will also remind existing 
members what Block One was like so they will 
remember to be patient when working with a new 
recruit. At the very least, the following will show 
you the fun you can have in the Police Academy.  
 
Day One 
 
I was both nervous and excited because this was 
the day I had been waiting for. After all the 
hoops I had to jump through just to get hired, I 
was finally here. On day one of the Police 
Academy I arrived 45 minutes early, looking and 
feeling like Bambi on ice for the first time. I sat 
outside in my car for about 10 minutes just trying 
to relax enough to be able to walk in without 
falling flat on my face. I looked around to see if I 
could find someone else with the same look of 
panic I was feeling, but everyone else seemed to 
know what they were doing and where they were 
going. I felt as though I was the only one 
suffering from this emotional turmoil. I walked 
into the classroom to find most of my classmates 
already there. I initially thought I was late, but I 
quickly realized it was because we all had the 
first day jitters. After finding my seat I looked 
around at all the new faces. Everyone seemed 
confident and relaxed. I hoped that I could at 
least fake it, because I was a nervous wreck 
inside.  
 
The first day went by in a blur. I was overloaded 
with information about the Justice Institute, 
what was expected of me, and what the next 11 
weeks were going to be like. At the beginning of 
the day, the typical classroom introductions were 
made. Everyone had to stand up, introduce 
themselves, and explain why they wanted to be 
police officers. There were three categories of 
answers ranging from "Policing is what I was 
meant to do since I was born", "I cannot wait to 
learn all there is to know about policing" and 
"What am I getting myself into?" While listening 
to the introductions, I learned that each person 
in our class came from a different place in life, 
with different experiences, ideas and beliefs. 
However, we all had one common goal; to survive 
Block One, to make it out to the field for Block 
Two, and ultimately to graduate.  
 
It became apparent that training was not based 
on individuals, but on the ability of the class to 
work as a team. The instructors set the tone of 
Block One with rigid discipline. They continually 
repeated some things that will stay with me 
forever:   
 
1. I am a police officer. People will look at and 
treat me differently.  
2. The general public will be watching me through 
a microscope waiting for a chance to put me on 
the 6 o'clock news.   
3. There are three sure-fire ways to get kicked 
out of the academy; lying, cheating, or stealing.  
4. For every seat in the class, there were 20 
other candidates that could have replaced me.  
I should feel proud of my achievements. 
5. There are many ways to survive Block One, but 
I have to figure them out for myself, with the 
help of my classmates. 
 
This was also the beginning of group physical 
training. Throughout the day we heard about the 
pending journey up Holmes Hill due to happen 
after lunch. It started out with a 3 km run to a 
large field followed by forming what was known as 
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the Ring of Fire. In short, the Ring of Fire was 
approximately 150 push-ups and 150 sit-ups. 
Next, we proceeded to the bottom of Holmes Hill 
where we were we told by the instructors that on 
the way up there was no walking or stopping. We 
jogged to what I thought was the top of the hill, 
until we turned a corner. I noticed the hill just 
kept going up and up.  Just when I thought I could 
not make it any further, we reached the top. A 
job well done, only 54 days left. 
 
Diving In Head First 
 
After the first day, I became accustomed to life 
at the Police Academy. There were a few bumps 
along the way, for example trying to break habits 
that have been ingrained since childhood, like 
calling people sir to show them respect. How was 
I supposed to know it was some sort of insult? A 
few rounds of push-ups quickly broke me of that 
habit, except for a small slip in week eleven.  It is 
amazing how quickly a person can learn when they 
cannot feel their arms. My days became filled 
with attending different classes, all of which 
provided their own unique experiences. 
  
Inspection 
   
During our first inspection I thought we all looked 
pretty sharp. I was a bit surprised when our 
Sergeant began picking us apart. He pointed out 
shirts that needed ironing, boots that were not 
shiny enough, and in one case, one boot that was 
shinier than the other. He was very picky about 
hair that was too long and it was not long before 
the buzz cuts made their way on the heads of 
several recruits. What I really wanted to know 
was how small a spec of lint had to be before it 
went unnoticed? After a couple of failed 
inspections and a few more rounds of push ups, we 
figured out it was not about the lint, but about 
working as a team to remove it.  
  
Drill  
 
Drill is the class where we learned how to march. 
I thought to myself, "This will be easy, it's just 
like walking, how hard can it be?" For some of my 
classmates, drill class was a nightmare. I saw 
more than one classmate out of step doing the 
"bear walk". In order to correct our marching 
errors, the Drill instructors used their own form 
of motivation, usually involving a raised voice or 
insult (I'm not sure what the memory retention 
of a turtle is, but I am sure it is not good).  After 
all, this was practice for our graduation ceremony 
and we all wanted to look our best.  
 
Firearms / Driving  
 
This was the most fun I had while getting paid. I 
had to survive one day of "driving with finesse" 
before I got to the good stuff. The good stuff 
was driving around the track, trying not to crash 
into the cornfield or hitting a barrel, but these 
activities are also very fun as a few recruits will 
attest. Firearms training was a little bit more 
stressful than driving. I have never even held a 
gun before let alone shoot one. Day one of 
firearms training was a lecture, followed by being 
issued a firearm. As the box containing my new 
gun was placed in front of me I thought, "I cannot 
believe they are giving me a gun".  In the following 
classes came the unique experience of shooting a 
gun for the first time.  I felt nervous with all the 
power I had in my hands, but when the initial 
shock wore off, I became more confident 
handling a gun.   
 
Legal studies  
 
This was the most academic portion of Block One 
and the basis for all of our authority as police 
officers. I was given an incredible amount of 
information and was told by the instructors that 
although this makes up about 7% of what I 
needed to know, I would spend 93% of my time 
cramming for legal studies exams. This was true 
as I spent more time studying for one of my legal 
exams than I did for the rest of the exams 
combined. This class is where several classmates 
discovered the "extra-long blink", leading to an 
elbow in the ribs from the person sitting next to 
them and a re-discovery of caffeine in all of its 
forms. Just when I thought my brain was full, I 
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received yet another power point handout and was 
told to read the corresponding chapter in time 
for the next class.  
 
Professional Patrol Tactics/Traffic  
 
These classes consisted mostly of practical police 
knowledge. The most valuable lessons came from 
the instructors' personal experiences when they 
were out on the road. I learned a lot (and laughed 
a lot) from listening to these stories.  For 
example, what to say during a traffic stop to earn 
a visit from the Internal Investigations section.  
I also learned the three rules to remember when 
processing a crime scene:  
 
1. Don’t touch anything.   
2. Don’t touch anything.  
3. Don’t touch anything.   
 
Remember, there are no stupid questions, unless 
you want to know if it is okay to put a temporary 
licence permit on the back of a motorcycle helmet 
(The answer is no, if you were wondering).  
 
Arrest and Control 
 
This was one of the most important classes at the 
Police Academy. Here I was taught officer safety 
tactics that could ultimately save my life. I 
overcame being shy at having to feel up 
someone's crotch in order to conduct a proper 
search and felt what it was like being on the 
receiving end of an arm-bar takedown.  It seemed 
that the more officer safety tactics I learned, 
the more confident I became. Plus we got to use 
all the tools on our duty belts. 
  
Simulations 
 
Simulations lasted for two days near the end of 
Block One. I was able to use all the things I 
learned and put them into a practical setting. It 
gave me an idea of what it would be like taking 
calls in the field.  There were many mistakes and 
blunders made by all of us but it proved to be the 
most valuable learning experience.  Although no 
one explained specifically how to deal with each 
and every situation, my common sense and 
knowledge pulled me through.  
 
Conclusion  
 
With Block One behind me, I can look forward to 
new and equally nerve-racking experiences in the 
months to come. I am satisfied that although I 
was not taught everything, I was given the tools I 
need to stay safe and continue learning. When I 
look back at my experiences in Block One, it 
reminds me of the climb up Holmes Hill. I started 
out slow and cautious, not knowing what to expect. 
I kept climbing until I reached what felt like the 
top of the hill where things seem to ease up just 
a little. Then I realized there was still a long way 
to go and it became continually steeper until the 
top was finally reached.  
 
I will not only look back on my personal success of 
completing Block One, but also on the class’ 
accomplishment of completing it as a team. I now 
realize how strong the bond is between my fellow 
constables. These relationships, whether a 
sincere friendship or a mutual respect, cannot be 
understood or denied by any outside observers.  
This is one of the true benefits of the Police 
Academy experience. 
  
The Lighter Side  
 
Despite the tremendous pressure to achieve 
greatness, there were fun times to be had, 
usually at someone else’s expense. The moment 
was especially sweet when the person who made a 
mistake had to contribute involuntarily to the 
class’ grad fund. For example, during Block One 
simulations, one recruit advised a suspect, "You 
are under assault for arrest". At Boundary Bay, 
we spent the day practicing tactics for vehicle 
stops. One recruit stopped a vehicle for speeding 
and received information from dispatch that the 
driver was under investigation and all information 
obtained was to be forwarded to a detective. The 
recruit had no idea what this meant so when the 
driver demanded to know if he was free to go, he 
told him, "You are under arrest for speeding...and 
some other things I'm working on".  
  
In the real world, one may be expected to have to 
wrestle a 6 foot 7, 300 lb bad guy to the ground. 
As one of our classmates found out, if this "bad 
guy" happens to be a Sergeant, taking him down 
on the hard concrete is probably not a good idea. 
Anything can happen in the sanctity of the change 
room. It can be where you discover even the 
tough guys have a soft side.  
 
In firearms class, always listen to what your 
Sergeant says. Here is an actual scenario that 
happened during our firearms training: 
 
Sergeant:  “Draw!" 
Recruit fires two rounds. 
Sergeant: "What are you doing, did I say 
fire? Let's try that again. Draw!" 
Recruit fires two rounds. 
Sergeant: Shakes his head. 
Outcome: Push-ups. 
 
And a word of advice to future recruits; do not 
recite the old cliché, "when you assume you make 
an ass out of you and me" while pointing at your 
Sergeant.  They will be quick to point out that it 
is just you.  
 
BUS LOCKER SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE: EVIDENCE 
INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30 
 
Two Winnipeg bus depot security 
 
At trial, Justice Aquilla of the Manitoba 
Provincial Court excluded the evidence because he 
concluded that the police violated the accused’s 
s.8 Charter right to be secure from unreasonable 
search and seizure. Even though the Charter did 
not apply to the initial search by the private 
security guards because they were not agents of 
the state, the accused nonetheless had a personal 
and reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
rented locker when the police searched it. The 
police exhibited a casual attitude towards 
accused’s Charter rights and the evidence was 
excluded. He was acquitted.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal. The appeal court justices found that 
there was no search and seizure by state agents 
at all, even when the police opened the locker. 
The security guards merely transferred their 
control of the contents to the police. If the 
security guards had placed the contents 
elsewhere after their find, there would have been 
no search and seizure. The fact the guards placed 
the contents back into the locker should not 
change the result; a transfer of control from the 
security guards to the police had occurred. The 
appeal was allowed and a conviction was entered. 
 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Justice Arbour, writing for Canada’s 
unanimous high court, agreed with the lower 
courts that the security guards were not agents 
of the state and therefore the initial search did 
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guards investigated the contents 
of a Greyhound Bus Lines locker. 
The locker was opened using a 
master key and a duffel bag was removed and 
examined. After finding a quantity of marihuana 
rolled up in the middle of a sleeping bag, the 
security guards replaced the contents back into 
the locker, locked it, and contacted police. Police 
attended, smelled marihuana at the locker, and 
had it opened without a warrant.  The drugs were 
seized and the accused was subsequently 
arrested and charged with possession of 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.  
that the accused did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
locker when the police entered and searched it, 
albeit not as high as one would expect in their 
body, home, or office. He paid a rental fee for 
exclusive use of the locker, he had possession of 
the key and could regulate access to it, and there 
were no signs suggesting the locker may be 
opened and searched. Third party ownership of 
the locker or the existence of a master key did 
not extinguish his privacy. 
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The initial privacy invasion by the security guards 
into the locker, even though free from Charter 
scrutiny, did not cause the accused’s expectation 
of privacy to end and subsequently justify 
further privacy invasions. Justice Arbour stated: 
 
In this case, it cannot reasonably be said that 
the [accused] had ceased to have a privacy 
interest in the contents of his locker.  The 
subsequent conduct of the police should be 
considered a seizure within the meaning of s. 
8. I see no basis for holding that a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy as to the 
contents of a rented and locked bus depot 
locker is destroyed merely because a private 
individual (such as a security guard) invades 
that privacy by investigating the contents of 
the locker.  The intervention of the security 
guards does not relieve the police from 
the…requirement of prior judicial 
authorization before seizing contraband 
uncovered by security guards.  To conclude 
otherwise would amount to a "circumvention of 
the warrant requirement" ….  The security 
guards' search of the locker, which is not 
subject to the Charter, cannot exempt the 
police from the stringent prerequisites that 
come into play when the state wishes to 
intrude the appellant's privacy … [references 
omitted, para.34] 
The Court also rejected the Crown’s plain view 
argument. For plain view to apply, the police 
needed prior justification for entry into the 
locker, which they did not have. Since there were 
no exigent circumstances or other statutory or 
common law authority to justify the search and 
seizure, the Crown could not rebut the 
presumption that a warrantless search or seizure 
is prima facie unreasonable.  
 
Considering all of the factors, including the lower 
court’s concern that the Charter breach was 
serious and that it was necessary to discourage 
police misconduct of this kind, the Supreme Court 
of Canada found the trial judge’s exclusion of the 
evidence was reasonable. The accused’s acquittal 
was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
LOCKER DOG SNIFF 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Dinh and Lam, 2003 ABCA 201 
 
The police were at a Calgary bus 
depot as part of a “Jetway” drug 
detection program. A police dog 
was deployed to sniff for the 
smell of drugs on incoming buses 
and unloaded baggage. The police followed the 
accused Dinh and Lam  walking towards the public 
lockers after they exited the bus. Before the 
accused Dinh could completely close the locker 
she had placed her two pieces of luggage in, the 
police spoke to her and Lam. The police asked to 
see their tickets and identification. A police dog 
was also used to sniff around the lockers. The dog 
made a positive indication for drugs and a locker 
was opened so the dog could stick its head inside. 
Once more, the dog indicated the presence of 
drugs in the locker.  
 
At this time, the accused Dinh was in the 
washroom. A police officer entered the washroom 
to arrest her and found her in a cubicle. After 
she did not open the cubicle door on request, the 
officer went into an adjoining stall, stood on the 
toilet, and peered over the top to find Dinh 
holding a white package (later found to contain 
$14,000 cash). Dinh was arrested for possession 
of drugs for the purpose of trafficking. After 
searching Dinh’s baggage found in the locker the 
police discovered almost 7 kg of marihuana and an 
additional $1,475. Dinh was in possession of the 
key that opened the lock on a suitcase found in 
the locker. Lam was also arrested for possession 
of the drugs and a search subsequent to his 
arrest revealed a gram of heroin, a marihuana 
bud, and over $1000 in cash.  
 
At trial Dinh and Lam were acquitted. The trial 
judge found that they had been arbitrarily 
detained contrary to s.9 of the Charter when the 
police asked for their bus tickets. Furthermore, 
the police use of the drug dog to sniff inside and 
outside the lockers was a warrantless and 
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unreasonable search and seriously violated Dinh’s 
s.8 Charter right to privacy. The judge inferred 
that she intended to lock the locker before the 
police deliberately interfered. The evidence was 
excluded. 
 
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing that, although Dinh had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the luggage 
placed in the locker, she did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the odour emanating 
from it into the public area of the bus depot and  
detectable by a specially trained police dog. Since 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
there was no search and the indication by the 
police dog provided reasonable grounds to arrest 
both accused and search them and their 
belongings incidental to arrest. On the other 
hand, the accused submitted that they were 
arbitrarily detained and subject to unreasonable 
searches. They contended that the warrantless 
sniff provided personal and protected information 
concerning the contents of baggage which was 
unattainable though human senses. Thus, the 
search was unreasonable and the information 
obtained from the sniff could not be used to 
support their arrests and subsequent searches.  
 
In dismissing the Crown’s appeal, Justice Conrad, 
writing for the unanimous Alberta Court of 
Appeal, concluded that the police conducted a 
search when they were able to “see” into Dinh’s 
luggage by having the dog sniff, thereby obtaining 
information about her. The Court compared this 
to the police using a FLIR camera while flying 
over a house suspected of having a marihuana 
grow operation to uncover heat emanating from 
the premises otherwise undetectable by human 
senses. Justice Conrad wrote: 
 
If it is improper for the police to invade a 
privacy interest using a technique or 
device that goes beyond enhancing the 
human senses, it does not matter whether 
it is a sophisticated technological FLIR 
device or a police dog with an acute sense 
of smell. The effect is the same.  
 
The police did not discover the odour of 
marihuana through inadvertence, but were 
deliberately trying to discover what was inside 
the luggage using the aid of a police dog’s 
enhanced olfactory senses Since the police 
search (dog sniff) was warrantless, it was 
unreasonable unless the police could otherwise 
justify it under statute or common law. There 
were no reasonable grounds or even an articulable 
cause to target the accused for investigation. 
The appeal court ruled that the trial judge’s 
findings of an arbitrary detention and 
unreasonable searches were not in error. The 
trial judge’s exclusion of the evidence under 
s.24(2) of the Charter was also reasonable. The 
acquittals were upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
NEW SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA JUDGE APPOINTED 
 
On September 9, 2003, Mr. 
Justice Morris Fish was 
appointed from the Quebec 
Court of Appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
Chief Justice McLachlin 
stated, "Justice Fish is a remarkable judge. His 
experience and expertise will undoubtedly be a 
great asset to the Supreme Court of Canada. I am 
pleased that Justice Fish will be able to take up 
his duties in time for the opening of the Fall 
Session on October 6th and that we will have a full 
complement of judges to tackle the upcoming 
cases on our agenda." Canada’s top court is 
comprised of nine justices, three of which must be 
from Quebec.  For more information on the 
Supreme Court of Canada, visit their web-site at 
www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“How far that little candle throws his beams! So 
shines a good deed in a weary world “ – William 
Shakespeare
 CLASS 92 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 92 as qualified 
municipal constables on July 25, 
2003. 
 
DELTA 
Cst. Phillip Di Battista 
Cst. Jason Formby 
Cst. Kimberly Petruka 
 
NEW WESTMINSTER  
Cst. Felipe Correa 
Cst. Sean Schultz 
 
STL’ATL’IMX 
Cst. Steven Davidson 
 
WEST VANCOUVER 
Cst. Steven McCuaig 
Cst. Jeff Palmer 
Cst. Jennifer Simms 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Deborah Baxter 
Cst. David Buchanan 
Cst. Christine Cho 
Cst. Blain Christian 
Cst. Jennifer Daniel 
Cst. Erin Holtz 
Cst. Ivis Lee 
Cst. Garett Legault 
Cst. Keith MacDonald 
Cst. Jennifer McInnis 
Cst. Kimberly Menzies 
Cst. Biant Padam 
Cst. Julie Riches 
Cst. Uwe Rieger 
Cst. Matthew Smart 
Cst. Jessie Tiwana 
Cst. Richard Vanstone 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Ivis Lee 
NO MINIMUM PUNISHMENT 
FOR IMPAIRED CAUSE BODILY 
HARM 
R. v. Gomes, 2003 ABCA 149 
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal has 
ruled that although there is a 
minimum penalty for impaired 
driving, there is no minimum for 
impaired driving causing bodily harm. The accused 
was convicted of impaired driving and, despite 
having a prior conviction for refusing to provide a 
breath sample, was sentenced to a nine month 
conditional sentence, 100 hours of community 
service, and a two year driving prohibition. The 
Crown appealed, arguing that the mandatory 
minimum impaired driving sentencing provisions 
under s.255(1)(a) of the Criminal Code apply to 
impaired driving causing bodily harm convictions; 
therefore, the conditional sentence was improper.  
 
Section 255(1)(a) of the Criminal Code creates 
mandatory minimum sentences for impaired 
driving convictions under s.253 (impaired 
driving/driving over 80mg%) and s.254 (refusal). V
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(Vancouver), who was the recipient 
of the British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit 
for best all around recruit 
erformance in basic training. Cst. Steven McCuaig 
West Vancouver) received the Abbotsford Police 
ssociation Oliver Thomson Trophy for 
utstanding physical fitness. Cst. Blain Christian 
Vancouver) received the Vancouver Police Union 
xcellence in Academics award for best academic 
est results in all disciplines. Cst. Phillip Di Batista 
Delta) received the British Columbia Federation 
f Police Officers Valedictorian award for being 
elected by his peers to represent his class at the 
raduation ceremony. Cst. Steven Davidson 
Stl’atl’imx) was the recipient of the Abbotsford 
olice Recruit Marksmanship award for highest 
ualification score during Block 3 training. Chief 
onstable Tom Karanfilis of the Stl’atl’imx Tribal 
olice Service was the keynote speaker at the 
eremony. 18
These include a $600 fine for a first offence, at 
least 14 days in jail for a second offence, and at 
least 90 days in jail for subsequent offences. 
Although this minimum sentencing regime is found 
in s.255, it only applies to offences under s.253 
and s.254, not s.255 offences themselves. 
Impaired causing bodily harm is one such offence 
created under s.255. Therefore, there is no 
minimum sentence for causing bodily harm while 
impaired and a conditional sentence is available. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Twenty years from now you will be more 
disappointed by the things that you didn't do 
than by the ones you did do. So throw off the 
bowlines. Sail away from the safe harbor. Catch 
the trade winds in your sails. Explore. Dream. 
Discover” – Mark Twain 
 FOUR & HALF YEAR SENTENCE 
STARTING POINT FOR DRUG 
COURIER 
R. v. Ma, 2003 ABCA 220 
 
Following his conviction in court 
trafficking.” This four and a half year term, with 
consideration of other sentencing principles like 
denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
protection of society, can be increased if there 
are aggravating circumstances and decreased if 
there are mitigating circumstances. Although the 
commercial nature of the operation, greed, and Volume 3 Issue 5 
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on a charge of possession of 
cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking, the accused was 
given a conditional sentence for 
his integral involvement as a middleman in a 
wholesale commercial drug trafficking scheme. 
The 19 year old, criminal record free accused 
delivered drugs for a major drug trafficker to 
dial-a-dopers. He also participated in delivering 
kilograms of cocaine to the major trafficker. The 
accused had been found in possession of 238 
grams of cocaine worth $23,823 in 10 plastic 
bags after he was stopped driving. The Crown 
appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing 
that the sentence was unfit and four and a half to 
six years would be more appropriate.  
 
Since conditional sentences can only be given for 
a duration of less than two years, the appeal 
court first examined whether such a sentence 
was appropriate. In holding that a sentence of 
less than two years was demonstrably unfit, the 
court found many factors warranted a more 
severe sentence, including: 
 
• crack cocaine is a hard drug, not a soft one, 
and is extremely addictive, costly, and leads 
to crime and prostitution; 
• the value of the drug was high; 
• the accused was a middleman, higher than a 
dial-a-doper, but lower than the major 
player who plead guilty and received 7 ½ 
years incarceration; and 
• trafficking in cocaine is highly profitable and 
the accused was not an addict. He was 
motivated purely by greed. 
 
In its ruling, the Court concluded that a sentence 
of four and a half years was the starting point 
for “a courier engaged in wholesale commercial 
the high cost to society of  trafficking crack 
cocaine, there were mitigating factors favouring a 
reduction in sentence. These mitigating factors 
included the age of the accused, the absence of a 
criminal record, his employment record, his family 
circumstances, and his guilty plea. The Alberta 
Court of Appeal set aside the conditional 
sentence and substituted a term of three years 
imprisonment.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
VOICE IDENTIFICATION 
OBTAINED IN BREACH OF 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
R. v. Ngo, 2003 ABCA 121 
 
During the course of a drug 19
trafficking investigation in 
Calgary, the police used an 
interpreter to translate 
intercepted telephone 
communications into English. The conversations 
were mostly in Vietnamese and the interpreter 
was told by police to pay attention to the voices 
for the purpose of voice identification. Three 
days after he was arrested in Vancouver on an 
outstanding warrant, the drug investigator 
traveled from Calgary to Vancouver to execute 
the warrant and arrange for transport back to 
Calgary. Arrangements were made for the 
interpreter to accompany the investigator to the 
detention centre to provide interpreter services, 
if required, and to determine if she could 
recognize the voice. The investigator informed 
the accused of the charge, cautioned him, and 
told him of his right to counsel. The interpreter 
translated, but the accused stated he understood 
English and did not need a translator.  
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The accused stated he wanted to speak to counsel 
but was not provided the opportunity. The 
investigator told the accused he would not be 
discussing the case, but needed to complete an 
administrative form regarding his transfer. For 
34 minutes the investigator interviewed the 
accused about personal information, however no 
form was completed. The interpreter, who 
remained in the room, identified the accused’s 
voice as one of the voices on the intercepted 
communications. This was tendered as evidence. 
 
At trial, the judge found that there were no 
Charter breaches under either s.7 (right to 
silence) or s.10(b) (right to counsel). He found 
that providing an opportunity for voice 
recognition was not akin to compelling someone to 
participate in the creation of inculpatory 
evidence. Since s.7 only protects the content of 
the statements and the words spoken here were 
innocuous, he ruled there was no protection under 
s.7. In addressing the s.10(b) issue, the trial 
judge concluded that “without delay” does not 
mean “immediately” and the police are entitled to 
carry out administrative procedures, as long as 
they do not create evidence, before they provide 
an arrestee with a reasonable opportunity to 
contact counsel. Since there was no identification 
evidence created, there was no breach. The 
accused was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in 
a controlled substance, but appealed to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing that obtaining 
evidence of the sound of his voice violated his 
right to counsel and his right to silence. 
 
Section 10(b) of the Charter guarantees an 
arrestee the right “to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to be informed of that right.” 
When an arrestee asserts a desire to contact a 
lawyer, the police are obligated to provide a 
reasonable opportunity and refrain from eliciting 
evidence until the opportunity has been provided. 
In this case, the completion of the form was used 
as a ruse to have the accused speak for the 
purpose of obtaining voice identification evidence, 
thus he was conscripted against himself. Further, 
there was no urgency to complete the 
administrative paperwork before allowing access 
to counsel. The accused had been in custody for 
several days and would be for several more. The 
police deliberately deceived the accused to 
create an opportunity for the interpreter hearing 
his voice. This was done to compel the accused to 
produce incriminatory evidence. His request for 
counsel was denied to prolong the dialogue and 
allow for voice identification. Thus, evidence was 
elicited and the police failed to comply with their 
obligation in holding off until counsel is contacted. 
Justice Paperny for the unanimous appeal court 
stated: 
 
[T]he evidence clearly establishes that [the 
accused's] attempt to exercise his 10( b) right 
to consult counsel was denied in an effort to 
prolong the dialogue, the purpose of which was 
to elicit evidence. The investigating officers 
conducted an interview which was made to 
appear routine for this very purpose. .... 
Instead of advancing the request, [the 
officer] advised the [accused] that he need 
not call his lawyer at that time because [the 
officer] would not be discussing the case but 
merely asking for some administrative 
information. This statement was intentionally 
misleading and intentionally disregarded the 
[accused's] right and the consequential police 
duty. [The officer] had devised a ploy to 
obtain voice identification evidence for use 
against the appellant at trial. The duties under 
s. 10( b), to provide a reasonable opportunity 
to consult with counsel and to " hold off" until 
a reasonable opportunity is facilitated, were 
breached. It was only as a result of these 
breaches that the voice identification 
evidence required to convict the appellant was 
obtained. [pra.36] 
 
Since the Court found a s.10 breach, it was not 
necessary to determine whether his right to 
silence was violated. The voice identification 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter. The evidence was conscriptive evidence 
and would render the trial unfair. Furthermore, 
although the breach was not invasive, like 
gathering bodily fluids, it nonetheless was 
flagrant and willful. There was no urgency. The 
 purposeful deception by the police prevented the 
accused from contacting counsel and could not be 
condoned by the Court. A new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
MANITOBA’s HIGH COURT 
RULES SOBRIETY 
QUESTIONING VIOLATES 
CHARTER 
R. v. Elias, 2003 MBCA 72 
 
Police stopped the accused after 
he was seen leaving a hotel, 
The Majority 
 
Since the accused was detained when he was 
randomly stopped by the police, he was entitled 
to be advised of his right to counsel unless that 
right could be suspended as a reasonable limit 
prescribed by law under s.1 of the Charter. 
Section 76.1(1) of Manitoba’s Highway Traffic 
Act allows the police to stop motorists for road 
safety purposes: 
 
s.76.1(1) Highway Traffic Act 
A peace officer, in the lawful execution of his or her 
duties and responsibilities, may require the driver of a 
motor vehicle to stop, and the driver of the motor Volume 3 Issue 5 
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enter his truck, and drive away 
at 1:44 am. An odour of liquor 
was noted on his breath and the 
officer asked if he had been drinking. The 
accused acknowledged drinking and an ASD test 
was demanded. The accused failed and he was 
arrested, cautioned, and given his rights under 
s.10(b) of the Charter. A breathalyzer demand 
was made and two tests resulted in readings of 
100mg%. The accused was charged with impaired 
driving and driving over 80mg%.  
 
At his Manitoba Provincial Court trial the accused 
was acquitted. The trial judge concluded that the 
accused’s rights under s.10(b) of the Charter 
were violated when the officer asked him if he 
had been drinking. The answer to the 
incriminating question was inadmissible under 
s.24(2) and therefore there was insufficient 
basis for the ASD demand. The fail reading on 
the ASD was therefore also excluded. In the end, 
there was no basis for the breathalyzer demand. 
The charges were dismissed. The Crown’s appeal 
to the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench was 
allowed. That court found the police were entitled 
and had a duty to ask questions related to 
sobriety. The acquittal was set aside and a new 
trial was ordered. The accused then appealed to 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which was divided 
on the issue. 
 
vehicle, when signalled or requested to stop by a peace 
officer who is readily identifiable as such, shall 
immediately come to a safe stop and remain stopped 
until permitted by the peace officer to depart. 
 
Legal reasons for which a police officer may stop 
a driver include driver’s licence, registration, 
insurance, and mechanical fitness checks. If 
during these routine stops the officer forms a 
reasonable suspicion the person has alcohol in 
their body, an ASD demand can be made under 
the Criminal Code. However, the majority ruled, 
“there is no provision that expressly or by 
necessary implication authorizes a police officer 
to question a detained driver concerning alcohol 
consumption.” In other words, s. 76.1(1) nor any 
other provisions of the Highway Traffic Act allow 
for inquiries respecting sobriety. Furthermore, 
nothing can be found in the common law. Hence, 
there is no “reasonable limit prescribed by law” 
that would justify a limit on the accused’s right to 
counsel under s.1 of the Charter when a driver is 
stopped and questioned about alcohol 
consumption.  
 
Having found a s.10(b) violation, the majority then 
determined whether the evidence was admissible 
under s.24(2). In this case the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol 
in his body on the basis of the liquor odour. This 
observation, apart from the admission of 
consumption, provided an adequate basis for the 
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ASD demand.  Justice Philp (Justice Freedman 
concurring) wrote: 
 
Evidence of the odour of alcohol apparently 
emanating from the sole occupant of a vehicle 
who had been observed departing a hotel in the 
early hours of the morning may not amount to 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
driver had alcohol in his body. In my view, 
however, those circumstances are more than 
sufficient to meet the objective component of 
the reasonable suspicion required for an ASD 
demand. 
 
Since the evidence of the ASD and the subsequent 
breathalyzer readings would have been obtained 
without the offending question, the trial would not 
be unfair. The s.10(b) violation was not serious. 
The police were not abusive or aggressive and the 
question was not an intrusive interrogation. The 
breathalyzer evidence would have been obtained 
without the Charter breach and the exclusion, not 
its admission, would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed and the order by the Queen’s Bench 
justice ordering a new trial stood. 
 
The Minority 
 
Justice Kroft took a different view. He concluded 
that the accused’s s.10(b) right to counsel was 
limited by law. In his opinion, the power of inquiry 
(asking questions) is included in the power to stop a 
motorist and in some cases this may justify limiting 
a persons Charter rights, like what happened in 
this case. He stated: 
 
I do not suggest that the authority to impose 
intrusive tests like compulsory statements or 
sobriety tests should be implied, but I have 
little doubt, after reviewing our drinking and 
driving legislation, that once having brought a 
vehicle to a halt, police officers are authorized 
and expected to make a cursory investigation or 
screening to ascertain if the concerns of both 
the [Highway Traffic Act] and the Code are 
being met. That is, during the brief 
investigation conducted at the side of the road, 
the police are expected to make a meaningful, 
but non-intrusive inquiry regarding licensing, 
insurance, sobriety and mechanical fitness. If 
an inadvertent breach of some Charter 
provisions such as s.8 or s.10(b) is committed, in 
a minor or trivial form, the admissibility of 
evidence obtained through the inspection will be 
determined by applying the standard which has 
emerged from s. 1 of the Charter.  
 
Justice Kroft found that the denial of the 
accused’s right to counsel was a reasonable limit. 
Even if the suspension of the right was not 
justified, he was of the view, like the majority, 
that the evidence should not be excluded. He 
would have also dismissed the appeal and ordered a 
new trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
IN MANITOBA, RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL MUST PROCEED 
SOBRIETY TESTING 
R. v. Orbanski, 2003 MBCA 43 
 
The police stopped the accused 22
after he was observed drive 
through a stop sign, make a wide 
turn, drive onto the shoulder, and 
swerve back and forth.  The officer could smell an 
odour of liquor from the accused’s breath. His 
eyes were glossy and he admitted to having one 
beer. The accused was asked to step from his 
vehicle and perform roadside sobriety tests. He 
was told the tests would be voluntary, that he did 
not have to do them, and that he could call a 
lawyer. However, the abbreviated Charter warning 
was not read from a card and was deficient in that 
it did not meet the informational components 
mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
advising of the availability of duty counsel and 
legal aid. The accused declined a lawyer and agreed 
to the tests. The accused failed the sobriety tests 
and the breathalyzer demand was given. 
Subsequent analysis resulted in readings above the 
legal limit. The accused was charged with impaired 
driving and over 80mg%.  
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At trial in Manitoba Provincial Court, the judge 
found the accused’s right to counsel under s.10(b) 
was violated. In his view, there was nothing in the 
common law or under statute which would allow the 
police to limit his right to a lawyer under s.1 of the 
Charter when he was stopped and subject to the 
sobriety tests. As a result, he excluded the 
evidence of the sobriety tests and the 
breathalyzer readings under s.24(2). The Crown 
appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 
 
In balancing individual rights with highway safety, 
the unanimous Court of Appeal concluded that a 
driver stopped by the police is entitled to be 
informed of and consult with counsel before being 
asked to undergo sobriety tests. Before a court 
can consider whether there is a limitation on a 
person’s constitutional rights under s.1 of the 
Charter, the limitation itself must be prescribed 
by law. Such a limitation can be found either at 
common law or under statute. In this case, the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal ruled that there is no 
common law rule or statutory provision that allows 
for sobriety testing without a driver being 
properly advised of their right to counsel. 
 
Crown Counsel tried, unsuccessfully, to argue that 
the statutory obligation imposed by s.76.1(1) of 
Manitoba’s Highway Traffic Act  on drivers to stop 
at the roadside when signaled by police includes, 
by necessary implication, the authority to conduct 
appropriate investigative measures. The Court 
opined that neither this section, nor ss.265 or 
263.2(1.1) of the Highway Traffic Act, gave police 
officers the express or implied authority to 
compel sobriety tests. Therefore, there was no 
limit prescribed by law that would justify a driver 
being denied his right to counsel before being 
requested to perform sobriety or coordination 
tests.  
 
However, despite the Charter breach, the 
evidence was admitted. The roadside testing 
evidence was non conscriptive. The police did not 
compel or coerce the tests; they were voluntary. 
Nor was the breach serious. Finally, the accused’s 
erratic and dangerous driving was sufficient to 
raise the suspicion that he was impaired. The 
reputation of the administration of justice would 
be better served by admitting the evidence.  The 
accused’s acquittal was set aside and a new trial 
was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
POLICE ENTITLED TO 
CONTINUE QUESTIONING 
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH 
COUNSEL  
R. v. Bohnet, 2003 ABCA 207 
 
Following the discovery of a body 
at a drive in movie site, the 23
accused agreed to attend the 
police station for an interview on 
the invitation of the police. He 
was advised of his right to counsel. After initially 
speaking to the accused for an hour and a half 
and consensually taking his shoes, he was 
arrested for the improper disposal of a body and 
was again advised of his Charter rights. He was 
also warned that he may be charged with a much 
more serious offence if a scheduled autopsy 
determined the death was culpable.  
 
The accused was allowed to contact a lawyer and 
told the police he would take his lawyer’s advice 
and not make a statement or answer questions. 
However, he agreed to accept a police offer to 
tell him about their investigation. This included 
information that the police had recovered a 
receipt near the body that could be traced to 
him. The accused told police he wanted to talk to 
his lawyer and that the discussion should cease. 
The police ignored his request and continued to 
speak to him. Eventually, he confessed to the 
murder.  
 
At his first degree murder trial in the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench, the judge admitted the 
statements. In his view, the accused’s right to 
silence was not violated. He had received legal 
advice from a lawyer and the police were entitled 
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to continue questioning provided they did not 
override his right to choose whether to answer or 
not or deprive him of an operating mind. 
Moreover, his right to counsel was not breached. 
He had been fully and fairly apprised of his legal 
jeopardy before he contacted a lawyer and it did 
not change thereafter. The accused appealed to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred in finding no 
Charter violations.  
 
The Right to Silence 
 
The appeal was dismissed by Alberta’s top court. 
In proper circumstances, there is no breach of 
the right to silence where an accused “has 
consulted counsel, asserted a right to silence, is 
persuaded by the police to continue talking, and 
ultimately confesses.” Justice Hunt, for the 
unanimous court, stated: 
 
In this case, the [accused] consulted a lawyer 
who, apparently, advised him not to make 
any statements. Although he was not given a 
second opportunity to talk to his lawyer 
before he confessed, that was not a Charter 
breach in the context of this case…. The fact 
that the police successfully engaged him in 
further discussions after he had stated he 
would follow his lawyer’s advice not to say 
anything, and after he once more said that 
discussions should cease, does not constitute a 
breach of his rights. As was observed by the 
majority [of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R. v. Hebert], “[p]olice persuasion, short of 
denying the suspect the right to choose or 
depriving him of an operating mind, does not 
breach the right to silence.” What the police 
did in this case was not outside the acceptable 
boundary. [para. 16] 
 
The Right to Counsel 
 
The accused argued that there had been a change 
in legal jeopardy when he went from being 
questioned about the disposal of his estranged 
wife’s body to her killing. Further, he suggested 
that once he admitted to strangling his wife, he 
should have been re-advised of his right to 
counsel. The Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed. 
In holding that the trial judge did not err in his 
ruling when he found there was no change in legal 
position, the Court stated: 
 
[The accused] was advised of his right to 
counsel at the outset of the interview, when 
he was told that he was a person of interest in 
the investigation. At that point, he declined to 
consult a lawyer. He was advised a second 
time, when he was told he was under arrest 
for improper disposal of the body and that, 
depending on the outcome of the autopsy, he 
could face a homicide charge. He was asked by 
the police whether he understood and replied 
that he did. [para. 18] 
 
The appeal was dismissed and the conviction was 
upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
ANONYMOUS TIP REQUIRES 
VERIFICATION OF CRIMINAL 
ASPECT 
R. v. Campbell, 2003 MBCA 76 
 
The police received a telephone tip 
from an anonymous informant that 24
the accused would be transporting 
drugs between Winnipeg and 
Thompson under the guise of 
attending a snowmobile race. The informant, who 
stated he was aware the accused was trafficking 
in drugs and enjoying a lifestyle beyond his 
legitimate means, refused to identify himself. A 
vehicle description, licence plate number, and 
occupation of the accused were provided. 
Although the informant did not say he had 
personal knowledge of the information, the police 
officer believed he did. He was told to call back 
when the accused was making his trip to 
Thompson. The police confirmed the accused 
resided at the same address as the vehicle’s 
registered owner and that there were snowmobile 
races scheduled in Thompson in two weeks.  
 
Two weeks later the informant called police and 
reported the vehicle was enroute to Thompson. 
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Acting on the tip, the accused was stopped and 
asked to produce his driver’s licence. In response 
to the officer’s enquiry about the purpose of his 
trip, the accused stated he was going to the 
snowmobile races. He also replied “No” in 
response to the officer’s question whether there 
were any drugs or liquor in the vehicle. The 
accused was asked to step from the vehicle, 
arrested, advised of his right to counsel, and his 
vehicle was towed. After speaking to a lawyer, 
the accused confirmed there were drugs hidden 
in the car. A search warrant was obtained and 
several kilograms of marihuana and cannabis resin 
were found hidden in the car door.  
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court, the 
judge found that the police had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused. The arrest was 
lawful, the detention was not arbitrary, and the 
search warrant was properly obtained. However, 
the accused was not informed of his right to 
counsel without delay when he was first stopped. 
Despite this breach, the drug evidence was not 
conscripted and its exclusion was not justified. 
The evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of possession for the purpose of 
trafficking x 2 and one count of simple 
possession. The accused appealed to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal arguing that his rights to be free 
from arbitrary detention (s.9 Charter), 
unreasonable search and seizure (s.8 Charter), 
and right to counsel (s.10(b) Charter) were 
violated.  
 
Reasonable Grounds 
 
In order for the police officer to arrest the 
accused or obtain a search warrant for the 
vehicle, reasonable grounds to believe that he was 
transporting drugs was necessary. Evidence of 
the tip itself is insufficient. Three areas are 
assessed in determining whether reasonable 
grounds exists when relying on informer tips: 
 
1. Is the information predicting the crime 
compelling? Bald conclusory statements, 
gossip, or rumour are not sufficient. 
 
2. Was the source of the tip credible? If the 
source is anonymous, credibility is unknown. 
 
3. Can the police corroborate the information by 
further independent investigation?   
 
Where an unidentified informant is supplying the 
information, “the standard of reasonable grounds 
will likely only be attained where the quality of 
information provided by the informant and the 
quality of the corroborative evidence adequately 
compensates for the inability to assess the 
credibility and reliability of the source.” This 
corroboration by the police “should confirm both 
the credibility of the informant and the tip 
itself.” Imperative in this analysis is that the 
information in some material respect 
corroborates the criminal aspect, not merely the 
“innocent” nature, of the informer’s tip.  
 
Although the tip itself was fairly compelling, no 
criminal aspects of the tip were verified. Only the 
innocent nature of the tip could be confirmed. 
Hence, the information’s reliability regarding 
criminal behaviour was not established, nor did 
reasonable grounds exist, ruled Manitoba’s 
highest court. Without reasonable grounds, the 
seizure of the vehicle leading to the search 
warrant was a violation of s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Arbitrary Detention 
 
Once the vehicle was stopped by the police the 
accused was detained. A detention will be 
arbitrary, and thus a violation of s.9 of the 
Charter, if it is conducted in the absence of 
articulable cause, a standard based on something 
less than reasonable grounds. Although the police 
did not have reasonable grounds, Justice Scott, 
writing for the unanimous Court, concluded the 
police had an articulable cause to stop and detain 
the accused on the basis of the tip along with the 
spotting of the vehicle exactly as predicted. The 
officers could exclude coincidence as a 
reasonable possibility at this time. The detention 
was not capricious, despotic, or unjustified. The 
arrest, despite its unlawfulness for lack of 
 V
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reasonable grounds, did not constitute an 
arbitrary detention.  
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Manitoba’s s.76.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act 
allows the police to stop motorists while s.25(12) 
obliges the driver to produce his driver’s licence 
when requested. In this case, stopping the 
accused and demanding his driver’s licence was 
authorized under statute. However, he was also 
asked where he was going and his answer provided 
further support of the tip. Section 76.1(1) does 
not provide authority for the police to conduct 
investigative measures of this nature. Thus, the 
accused was entitled to forthwith be advised of 
his right to counsel before being questioned by 
the officer. 
 
Exclusion of Evidence 
 
Despite the ss. 8 and 10 Charter breaches, the 
evidence was admissible. The trial would not be 
rendered unfair by its admission. The violations 
were not serious and the exclusion of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. The appeal was dismissed and the 
accused convictions stood. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
PROBATION SEARCH 
CONDITION UNREASONABLE, 
COURT LIMITS TIME FRAME 
R. v. Woroby, 2003 MBCA 41 
 
The accused plead guilty to 
i
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w
w
s
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Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
condition permitting warrantless searches prima 
facie violated his right to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure protected under 
s.8 of the Charter. The condition, he submitted, 
removed the necessity of judicial authorization 
requiring reasonable grounds. Crown Counsel took 
the position that the condition was reasonable in 
order to protect society, especially children.  
 
The right to privacy in one’s home is a highly 
protected Charter right. However, a person on 
probation has a reduced, but not non-existent, 
expectation of privacy. Further, probation is 
primarily a rehabilitative tool; it is not simply 
punishment. Any conditions must be rationally 
connected to the offence or they will be 
unreasonable. In this case, it was ruled by Justice 
Hamilton, for the unanimous Manitoba Court of 
Appeal, that the search condition was “intended 
to protect society by giving teeth to the 
condition that the [accused] not access child 
pornography.” Thus, the condition was rationally 
connected to the offence and could well assist 
the accused’s rehabilitation.  
 
However, a condition that nonetheless violates 
the Charter will be unreasonable. A search meets 
the reasonableness test if a reasonable law 
authorizes it and the manner in which the search 
is carried out is also reasonable. The search was 
authorized by law since the accused voluntarily 
consented to the condition, but the manner in 
which the search was to be carried out was 
unreasonable. Although a feature of random 
searches is essential because evidence can be 
easily deleted from a computer, the condition olume 3 Issue 5 
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possession of child pornography 
and was sentenced to a $10,000 
fine and supervised probation, 
ncluding a condition that he allow the police or 
robation Services to search his home computer 
ithout a warrant to ensure he was complying 
ith other conditions of the probation order, 
uch as not having internet access. Despite 
greeing to the condition at his sentencing 
earing, the accused appealed to the Manitoba 
allowed for searches at night. It would be 
reasonable to limit the time frame when the 
searches could be undertaken to a time 
consistent with when search warrants should be 
carried out under the Criminal Code (s.488). As a 
result, the Manitoba Court of Appeal amended 
the search condition to only allow searches 
between 6 am and 9 pm. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org  
 TRAFFICKING BY OFFER DOES 
NOT REQUIRE INTENT TO 
ACTUALLY SELL 
R. v. Murdock,  
(2003) Docket:C3795 (OntCA) 
 
The accused offered to sell an 
undercover police officer crack 
sell the drug. However, an offer made in jest 
would not attract culpability because it would 
not be a genuine offer.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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cocaine but later withdrew the 
offer. He was arrested several 
minutes later but did not have 
any drugs in his possession. At his trial, the 
accused denied offering to sell drugs to the 
officer, testified that he knew he was dealing 
with an undercover police officer from the 
beginning, and told the court that the officer 
made several requests to purchase drugs. The 
accused was convicted of trafficking in a narcotic 
contrary to s.5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA). The accused appealed to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal contending, among 
other arguments, that the offence of trafficking 
by offer is unconstitutional under s.7 of the 
Charter unless the Crown proves that he had the 
intention to actually sell or give the drug offered. 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the 
accused’s appeal. Trafficking by offer is a 
conduct offence; there is no requirement that 
consequences flow from the prohibited act. In 
other words, the Crown only need prove that the 
accused actually intended to make a genuine 
offer; not that he actually intended on selling the 
drug.  
 
The definition of “traffic” found in s.2 of the 
CDSA includes “to offer to [sell, administer, give, 
transfer, transport, send or deliver the 
substance.” Therefore, the offence of trafficking 
by offer is made out when: 
 
• (actus reus) the accused offers to traffic in a 
drug; and 
• (mens rea) the accused intends the offer be 
taken as true and genuine. It is not necessary 
to prove that an accused actually intended to 
R. v. Richfield,  
(2003) Docket:C39427 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested by 
police for failing to provide a 
roadside screening test and was 
advised of his right to counsel. 
He indicated he understood his 
right and asked to speak to a specific lawyer. He 
was also read the police caution and breathalyzer 
demand and was transported to the police station. 
The officer called the lawyer’s number and left a 
message about the accused’s arrest with a live 
answering service. An hour passed without a call 
back from the lawyer and it had been one hour 
and 45 minutes since the arrest. The accused was 
offered duty counsel but only wanted to speak to 
his lawyer. He was told a demand for samples was 
forthcoming and if he wanted legal advice he 
should get it now. Further, the function and 
availability of duty counsel was explained. Being 
attentive to the two hour evidentiary presumption 
under the Criminal Code, the police requested 
breath samples and the accused complied.  
 
At his trial, the judge excluded the breathalyzer 
results under s.24(2) of the Charter after holding 
that the police breached the accused’s right to 
counsel under s.10(b). In his view, the accused 
was denied the counsel of his choice and he was 
acquitted. The Crown appealed to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice but the earlier ruling 
finding a breach was upheld. However, the appeal 
judge allowed the breathalyzer readings under 
s.24(2) and a new trial was ordered. The accused 
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
 
Absent cases of urgency or danger, a detainee 
must be provided a reasonable opportunity to 
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exercise their right to counsel. Furthermore, the 
police must not elicit evidence, including breath 
samples, from the detainee until they have been 
provided the reasonable opportunity, which will 
depend on all the surrounding circumstances. 
Reasonableness does not entail an absolute right 
to counsel of choice but will be determined by the 
context of the situation. However, when the 
detainee is provided the opportunity, they must 
exercise their right diligently. The existence of a 
24 hour duty counsel is crucial and must be 
considered when assessing reasonable diligence. 
The availability of duty counsel may affect the 
length of the time in which the police will have to 
continue holding off from eliciting evidence. 
 
In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that the police could have been 
more diligent in facilitating the accused’s contact 
with his lawyer, like calling back or trying to 
locate a home number. However, despite this lack 
of effort by the police, they did not make any 
demands of the accused while they waited for 
over an hour and offered duty counsel when the 
lawyer had not called back. When told his lawyer 
did not call back, the accused did not ask to make 
another call to him or another lawyer, nor take up 
the offer of duty counsel. In the circumstances, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the  
accused had not been reasonably diligent in 
exercising his right to counsel. Thus, there was no 
s.10(b) Charter breach and no need to consider 
admissibility of the evidence under s.24(2). The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
RIGHTS VIOLATED BY FORCING 
CONTACT WITH LAWYER 
R. v. Hesketh, 2003 BCPC 173 
 
The accused was arrested for 
h
t
asked the accused if he wanted to call a lawyer. 
He responded, “Don’t need one. No way. No 
breath samples, period.” He again was asked if he 
wanted a lawyer and this time replied, “What’s he 
going to do for me?” The officer felt the accused 
was unsure of himself and a call was placed to 
Legal Aid. The accused spoke with a lawyer and 
subsequently provided two breath samples. Thirty 
one minutes had elapsed from the time of arrival 
at the police station and the taking of the first 
sample. He was charged with impaired driving and 
over 80mg%. 
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, 
the accused argued that the samples of breath 
were not taken as soon as practicable as required 
under the Criminal Code. He submitted that a 31 
minute delay in taking the breath samples was 
created by the officer when he forced the 
accused to speak to Legal Aid despite his clearly 
expressed decision not to speak to a lawyer. Thus, 
it was suggested, the accused’s rights under 
s.10(b) of the Charter were violated and that the 
certificate of breath analysis should be excluded 
under s.24(2). The Crown contended that the 
accused’s responses were equivocal and what the 
officer did was reasonable.  
 
In excluding the certificate, Justice Lenaghan 
concluded that the accused’s s.10 right was 
breached and that the samples were not taken as 
soon as practicable. He stated: 
 
It must be borne in mind that the right to 
counsel is an individual constitutional right and 
that the decision to exercise it or not to 
exercise it is one that is exclusively that of 
the subject individual. It cannot be 
appropriated by another person, regardless of 
how well-intentioned that other person might 
be. This is not to say that a police officer can 
never contact counsel on behalf of an accused 
person or arrange for some third-party to do 
so. Where a police officer encounters an olume 3 Issue 5 
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impaired driving and informed of 
his right to counsel under the 
Charter. The officer was certain 
e understood and the breathalyzer demand was 
hen read. While at the police station, the officer 
accused person who, by words or actions, 
expresses a lack of understanding of his right 
to counsel or is uncertain as to whether he or 
she ought to exercise that right, the law 
requires that officer, in my view, to take 
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further steps to ensure that the right is 
understood and that any decision not to 
exercise it is an informed decision.  
 
The situation is different, however, where an 
accused person indicates an understanding of 
the right to counsel and expresses a clear 
intention not to exercise that right. In such 
circumstances, in my view, a police officer 
must respect the decision of the accused 
person, regardless of his view of the wisdom 
of that decision. [paras. 42-43] 
 
In this case, the officer testified he was 
“absolutely certain” the accused understood his 
rights. The accused’s answer, “Don’t need one. No 
way. No breath samples, period,” was clear and 
unequivocal. In arranging the telephone call to 
Legal Aid, the officer “was acting contrary to 
that clearly expressed decision and thereby 
unjustifiably delaying the taking of breath 
samples from the [accused].” The breath samples 
were not taken as soon as practicable. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
OBSTRUCT NOT MADE OUT ON 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT HELMET 
FOR INSPECTION  
R. v. Hayes,  
(2003) Docket:C3613 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, who was stopped at 
a police roadcheck targeting 
members of a motorcycle gang 
holding an annual summer 
gathering in the area, repeatedly refused to 
remove his helmet and submit it for inspection. 
He was warned he would be charged with 
obstructing a peace officer if he continued to 
refuse. He was subsequently arrested for 
obstruction, his helmet was removed, and found 
to have a safety sticker.  
 
At his trial, the accused testified that he did not 
remove his helmet because he believed he was not 
obliged to do so. The trial judge acquitted him 
because he was not convinced the helmet was 
“equipment” subject to inspection under s.82 of 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act.  The Crown 
appealed and the acquittal was set aside. The 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice concluded that 
the helmet was “equipment” and subject to 
inspection. In his view, the officer was 
obstructed when the accused failed to remove 
the helmet. The accused then appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. 
 
Section 216 of the Highway Traffic Act allows 
the police to stop motorists and also creates an 
offence for failing to do so. Section 104(1) 
requires a motorcyclist to wear a helmet that 
complies with the regulations. Although there is 
no specific penalty provision for failure to wear a 
helmet under s.104(1), the general penalty 
provision of s.214(1) would apply. Section 82 
provides the police with the general statutory 
authority to examine vehicles and equipment, 
including helmets the Court of Appeal ruled, and 
also imposes a duty on motorcyclists to remove 
their helmets and submit them for inspection. 
However, failure to submit for inspection can 
result in a charge only if written notice has been 
provided. In this case, the Court held that the 
police were not entitled to use the obstruct 
power of arrest to enforce a provincial offence 
that already had a statutory enforcement regime 
defined by the legislature. Justice McCurtry 
stated: 
 
The problem with the Crown's argument is 
that it overlooks the fact that s.82(3) 
addresses precisely the same misconduct that 
forms the basis of the charge of obstruct 
police: the refusal to submit the helmet for 
inspection. Under s.82(3), a person who fails or 
refuses to submit their vehicle and its 
equipment to an inspection is subject to a fine 
of not more than $1,000. In other words, the 
legislature defined the enforcement 
mechanism for failing to submit for inspection 
as a fine under the HTA. The officer did not 
even attempt to use this enforcement 
mechanism, as he was empowered to do, which 
would have required him to give the [accused] 
a written notice for an inspection (s.82(4)). 
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Thus, the [accused] did not obstruct the police 
in the performance of his duty. If the 
[accused] had interfered with the officer's 
attempt to issue written notice for a vehicle 
inspection, the offence of obstruct police 
could have been made out. However, since the 
officer did not attempt to enforce his power 
to inspect the helmet under s. 82(3) by issuing 
the written notice as required by s. 82(4)…he 
was not entitled to invoke the far more serious 
offence of obstruct police or the Criminal 
Code arrest powers. [para. 42] 
 
The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set 
aside, and an acquittal was entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
ROUTINE VEHICLE STOP 
ABITRARY, BUT JUSTIFIED BY 
STATUTE 
R. v. Pelletier, 2003 NBCA 67 
 
A police officer randomly 
stopped the accused’s vehicle for 
h
s
f
w
s
t
c
b
 
A
t
s
o
t
s
s
T
o
o
t
Brunswick’s Motor Vehicle Act did authorize 
random (without reason) stops of motorists to 
conduct routine checks: 
 
s.15(1)(d) Motor Vehicle Act 
15(1) The Minister and such persons as the Minister 
may designate are deemed to be peace officers for the 
purpose of this Act and have the power…(d) when on 
duty, to require the driver of any vehicle to stop and 
exhibit his licence and the registration certificate for 
the vehicle and submit to an inspection of such vehicle, 
and the registration plates and the registration 
certificate thereon or to an inspection or test of the 
equipment of such vehicle… 
 
The accused appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal arguing that a stop conducted 
pursuant to this legislation authorized officers to 
only check licences, registration, and insurance. 
She further submitted that the police could not 
use this section to find other evidence of a crime. 
New Brunswick’s top court disagreed and denied 
the appeal. The police officer intercepted the 
accused during a routine check authorized by olume 3 Issue 5 
eptember/October 2003 
a routine check. Her documents 
were checked and the officer 
detected a smell of alcohol on 
er breath. A breath sample into a roadside-
creening device was demanded and the accused 
ailed. This provided reasonable grounds and she 
as arrested for impaired driving and 
ubsequently provided two breath samples over 
he legal limit at the police detachment. She was 
harged with operating a motor vehicle with a 
lood alcohol concentration over 80mg%. 
t her trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court, 
he accused was acquitted. In the judge’s view, 
he had been arbitrarily detained contrary to s.9 
f the Charter and the evidence of the 
echnician’s certificate was excluded under 
.24(2). It was held that the officer did not have 
ufficient cause before he stopped the vehicle. 
he Crown appealed and the New Brunswick Court 
f Queen’s Bench overturned the acquittal and 
rdered a new trial. In the appeal judge’s view, 
he trial judge erred because s.15(1)(d) of New 
s.15(d) of the Motor Vehicle Act.  It was during 
this lawful stop that the officer detected the 
odour of alcohol on the accused’s breath. At this 
time, her detention was no longer without cause 
and therefore was not arbitrary. Leave to appeal 
was denied. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
  
INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH 
RESULTS ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
s.24(2) CHARTER 
R. v. Omelusik, 2003 BCCA 319 
 
After stopping the accused for 30
excessive speeding, a police 
officer noted a number of $20 
bills in the accused’s right hand 
and a strong smell of marihuana coming from 
inside the vehicle. The accused was directed to 
step from the vehicle and he was told he was 
under investigation for possession of a narcotic. 
In moving the accused’s “kangaroo” top to look for 
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weapons in his waistband, the officer felt a soft 
object in the front pouch and pulled out a bag (15 
cm x 15 cm) containing marihuana. He was 
arrested and the officer continued his search, 
finding some “decks” of cocaine in his sweat pants 
pocket. Believing the amount of marihuana found 
was insufficient to account for the odour of 
marihuana in the vehicle, the officer searched 
the immediate area of the driver’s seat. Through 
the open door the officer saw a large clear plastic 
bag under the front seat. It contained marihuana 
and cocaine packaged consistent with trafficking. 
As well, the accused’s cell phone rang incessantly 
during the arrest. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, the 
judge accepted the evidence of the police 
officer. She concluded that the officer had an 
articulable cause for the detention and incidental 
search and that no s.8 Charter breach occurred. 
Furthermore, she ruled there was no s.10 
violation. The accused had unsuccessfully argued 
that he was not given an opportunity to use his 
cell phone at the scene to call a lawyer and that 
the police did not immediately provide him his 
Charter rights at the time of detention; it was 
only after he had been arrested that he was given 
them. The trial judge opined that the accused 
could not be given privacy in contacting a lawyer 
until he was at the jail and that the brief delay in 
advising of his rights was inconsequential; no 
incriminating statements were taken. Even if she 
were wrong about the breaches, the trial judge 
would have admitted the evidence under s.24(2).  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred 
in finding no Charter breaches and the evidence 
should be excluded and the accused acquitted. 
Among other grounds, it was his view that the 
police are not entitled to search for contraband 
during an investigative detention based on 
articulable cause. Moreover, he also submitted 
that the odour of marihuana alone could not 
provide sufficient grounds for detention.  
 
Justice Donald, writing for the unanimous court, 
assumed, without deciding, that there was no 
right to search the kangaroo pouch incidental to 
investigative detention. However, he held that 
the trial judge’s s.24(2) analysis was sound. In 
addressing the argument concerning the smell of 
marihuana, by itself, providing sufficient grounds 
justifying detention, Justice Donald stated: 
 
Whether the smell of marihuana is enough for 
a lawful arrest, or in this case detention, 
depends on the circumstances...  In the 
present case, the trial judge accepted [the 
officer’s] evidence that the odour was of cut 
marihuana, not marihuana smoke, and that, 
together with the other circumstances, was 
sufficient, in my view, to justify detention.  It 
followed that, for the officer's safety, he 
needed to search the [accused] for weapons 
and, in the course of that, he came upon the 
drugs in the pouch which gave ample grounds 
for his arrest. [references omitted, para. 20] 
 
The evidence was admissible under s.24(2) and 
the appeal was dismissed. 
 
 Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ENTRY TO COMMUNICATE 
WITH OCCUPANTS LAWFUL 
DESPITE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF 
GROW 
R. v. Charters & Leger, 2003 BCPC 204 
 
The police in a very small and 
isolated community received 31
several calls that a cougar had 
been sighted in the town. An 
officer went about the 
community to warn parents and residents in the 
area and to remind them to secure their garbage. 
He attended the accused’s residence after a 
neighbour informed him they permitted their 
dogs to run at large. While warning the accused 
Charters on the balcony of the home about the 
cougar and the concern of the dogs running at 
large, the officer heard the basement door open 
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and close. At this time he noted a strong odour of 
cannabis consistent with growing marihuana.  The 
officer walked down the stairs of the balcony and 
spoke to the accused Leger. While warning him 
about the cougar and the dogs, the officer noted 
the accused Leger had a green plant like 
substance consistent with marihuana of his wool 
sweater. A search warrant was subsequently 
obtained and both accused were charged with 
producing  marihuana and possession of marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking.  
 
During their trial voire dire in British Columbia 
Provincial Court, the accused argued that the 
results of the search were inadmissible because 
the police violated their s.8 Charter rights to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure 
because the officer may have had some prior 
knowledge of a possible marihuana grow operation 
before he entered onto the property. However, 
Justice Doherty found no such breach. Even 
though the officer may have had some prior 
knowledge of the grow operation it made no 
difference. He had a legitimate reason to be on 
the property; to warn the residents of cougar 
sightings. Furthermore, if he were wrong in his 
analysis, the judge would have admitted the 
evidence under s.24. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
IN MEMORIAL 
 
On September 20, 
2003, OPP officers 
were involved with a 
fleeing suspect vehicle 
on March Road, near 
Golden Line Road in 
Mississippi Mills 
Township. A collision occurred involving a stolen 
jeep, a pick-up truck and an OPP Motorcycle Unit. 
As a result of this collision, 54-year-old Senior 
Constable John Paul Flagg succumbed to his 
injuries in Almonte Hospital.  
 
Senior Constable Flagg began his career in July 
1968 as a cadet. More recently he was posted to 
the Kingston Detachment and for the past few 
years he has worked with the Eastern Region 
R.I.D.E Unit, stationed out of Quinte.  
 
"John was an extremely dedicated police officer 
with a passion for traffic 
safety," said OPP Commissioner 
Gwen Boniface. "He was very 
personable and always the 
gentleman. Once again, we 
grieve the loss of another 
fellow officer."  
 
The above information was prov
permission of the Officer Down 
available at www.odmp.org/canada 
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